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I. INTRODUCTION
By the beginning of 2021, the Trump Administration had
built or replaced 452 miles of a wall between Mexico and the
United States. 2 This milestone is in line with the Administration’s declared goal to build 450 miles of new or converted barriers by the end of 2020. 3 For much of the early stages of wall construction, the Administration was substantially behind this
target because of problems acquiring the land on which to build
the wall. 4 Although the government intended to use its eminent
domain powers aggressively, that process was slow and had the
potential to result in lengthy court proceedings, which made it
difficult for the Administration to meet its construction targets. 5
Substantial opposition to the wall by environmentalists, affected
property owners, and several states have further complicated the
intended schedule. Some of these groups object to the source of

2. Christopher Giles, Trump’s Wall: How Much Has Been Built During His
Term?, BBC (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46748492.
3. Nick Miroff & Adrian Blanco, Trump Ramps Up Border-Wall Construction
Ahead of 2020 Vote, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/graphics/2020/national.immigration/border-wall-progress/.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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funds for the wall’s construction, 6 others to its human rights impacts, 7 and still others to its environmental impacts. 8
This article is concerned with the constitutionality of the
border wall and the statute authorizing its construction, § 102 of
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(“IIRIRA”). Particularly, this article questions the constitutionality of § 102(c)’s provisions authorizing the waiver of laws that
would otherwise regulate the construction and maintenance of
the wall, as well as § 102(c)’s truncated appeal provisions, which
eliminate the mid-level appeal of any decision upholding the application of the statute. The article identifies two previously unexamined constitutional challenges to these problematic provisions: (1) that they violate the First Amendment’s Petition
Clause; and (2) that they infringe on retained unenumerated
rights protected by the Ninth Amendment. The latter might also
be deployed against the wall itself for interfering with the constitutionally protected unenumerated right to travel.
Discussing the constitutionality of IIRIRA’s waiver and truncated appeal provisions requires an understanding of the laws
regulating traffic across the U.S.-Mexico border. Part I sets the
stage by examining the history of the border wall and the problem of border crossings. Part II examines the evolution of IIRIRA,
with a particular emphasis on the waiver provisions and truncated appeal provisions of § 102(c). Part III focuses on the impacts of
border wall construction on the environment and Native American tribes. Part IV discusses the status of various challenges to
the wall’s construction and the fate of some of the legal arguments underlying them. Part V examines the vulnerability of the
statute’s judicial review and waiver provisions—as well as the
wall itself— to new challenges brought under the Petition Clause
of the First Amendment and the Ninth Amendment. The author
hopes that the discussion of these new claims persuades the
reader that they are of more than academic interest and may offer fresh avenues of persuading a court of the unconstitutionality
of these particular statutory provisions.

6. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2019); Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Trump, 2020 WL 1643657 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2020); El Paso Cnty. v. Trump,
407 F. Supp. 3d 655 (W.D. Tex. 2019).
7. See, e.g., El Paso Cnty. v. Trump, 408 F. Supp. 3d 840 (W.D. Tex. 2019).
8. See, e.g., In re Border Infrastructure Env’t. Litig., 915 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir.
2019); N. Am. Butterfly Ass’n v. Nielsen, 368 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019).
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II. BACKGROUND
Today, the border between the United States and Mexico
stretches 1,954 miles and runs through California, Arizona, New
Mexico, and Texas. 9 The United States constructed its first fence
along its southwestern border between 1909 and 1911 in southern
California. That original fence was made of barbed wire to prevent cattle from moving between the U.S. and Mexico. 10 Before
2005—the first significant expansion of the President’s authority
to waive laws that might impede construction of a physical barrier—approximately 119 miles of border fencing was in place. 11 The
George W. Bush Administration significantly increased efforts to
construct border fencing, with a particular focus on the region
consisting of and surrounding El Paso, Texas. 12 U.S. Customs and
Border Protection spent $2.3 billion on fencing at the U.S.-Mexico
border between 2007 and 2015, and, during that time period, expanded barriers between the two countries to cover 654 miles. 13
Barriers were extended in multiple regions, including near Tucson, Arizona, the Rio Grande Valley, and in the vicinity of San
Diego, California. 14 Of the 654 miles of barrier that lined the
U.S. border with Mexico in 2015, 300 miles were vehicle barriers,
while the rest were designed to keep pedestrians out.15
9. Denise-Marie Ordway, Building Border Walls and Barriers: What the
Research
Says,
JOURNALIST’S
RESOURCE
(Feb.
15,
2020),
https://
journalistsresource.org/studies/government/immigration/border-walls-barriersmigrant-research/.
10. See Rachel St. John, The Raging Controversy at the Border Began with This
(July/August
2018),
Incident
100
Years
Ago,
SMITHSONIAN
MAG
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/raging-controversy-border-began-100years-ago-180969343/#.X-PEbtNuzTk.link; see also Ordway, supra note 9.
11. See Louise Radnofsky, Border Barriers, Mile by Mile, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14,
2019,
8:55
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-border-wall-mile-by-mile11550152535; see also Ordway, supra note 9.
12. See Radnofsky, supra note 11; see also Ordway, supra note 9.
13. Border Barriers: Progress and Challenges with the Use of Technology, Tactical
Infrastructure, and Personnel to Secure the Southwest Border: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Border and Mar. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec, 115th
Cong. 9 (2018) (statement of Rebecca Gambler, Director of Homeland
Security & Justice, United States Government Accountability Office),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690679.pdf; see also Ordway, supra note 9.
14. See Radnofsky, supra note 11; see also Ordway, supra note 9.
15. Border Barriers: Progress and Challenges with the Use of Technology, Tactical
Infrastructure, and Personnel to Secure the Southwest Border: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Border and Mar. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec,, 115th
Cong. 9 (2018) (statement of Rebecca Gambler, Director of Homeland
Security & Justice, United States Government Accountability Office),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690679.pdf; see also Ordway, supra note 9.
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By the end of its tenure in office, the Trump Administration
had built over 450 miles of new or replaced barriers. 16 “Most of
the new wall will replace older and smaller barriers” and “is far
more formidable than anything previously in place along the border. The new structure [will have] steel bollards, anchored in concrete, that reach 18 to 30 feet in height and will have lighting,
cameras, sensors[,] and improved roads.” 17 The latter will enable
U.S. border patrol agents to respond quickly along what will be
“an expanded ‘enforcement zone.’”18
To pay for the wall, the Administration has been diverting,
and plans to continue diverting, money from the annual military
budget. 19 This action is the subject of multiple lawsuits, 20 but
these cases have yet to have any impact on the border wall’s construction. 21 For instance, in Sierra Club v. Trump, the district
court concluded that the diversion of military funds for border
wall construction was unlawful, but the permanent injunction
granted by that court was stayed by the Supreme Court. 22 Since
then, the Supreme Court has rejected requests to lift this stay, allowing the diversion of funds to continue. 23 As a result, as of the
date this article was written, $18.4 billion was available for wall
construction, which is enough to construct nearly 900 miles of
new barriers by 2022, 24 meeting the government’s goal.
16. See Giles, supra note 2.
17. Ordway, supra note 9 (quoting Miroff & Blanco, supra note 3).
18. Id.
19. See J. Edward Moreno, Appeals Court Revives House Lawsuit Against Trump
Border Wall, THE HILL (Sept. 25, 2020, 12:09 PM), https://thehill.com
/regulation/court-battles/518200-appeals-court-revives-house-lawsuit-against-trumpbroder-wall; see also FY2020 Defense Reprogrammings for Wall Funding:
Backgrounder, CRS (Mar. 24, 2020) (“On February 13, 2020, the Department of
Defense (DOD) transferred $3.8 billion from defense procurement programs to the
Army Operation and Maintenance account for use by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE) for the construction of 31 additional barrier projects along the
southern border of the United States.”).
20. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2019); Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Trump, 453 F. Supp. 3d 11 (D.D.C. 2020); El Paso Cnty. v. Trump, 407 F.
Supp. 3d 655 (W.D. Tex. 2019).
21. See El Paso Cnty. v. Trump, No. 19-51144 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (staying
the district court’s injunction because of “the substantial likelihood that [plaintiffs]
lack Article III standing.”).
22. See Sierra Club v. Trump, No. 19-cv-00892-HSG, 2019 WL 2715422 (N.D. Cal.
June 28, 2019).
23. See Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 2620, 2020 WL 4381616 (July 31, 2020).
24. Miroff & Blanco, supra note 3. Of the $18.4 billion available for wall
construction, $5.1 billion was approved by Congress as a routine appropriation to the
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The irony is that, while the number of migrants being taken
into custody at the border has declined, the number of migrants
detained who come from Mexico—the ostensible target of the
Trump Administration’s efforts—has increased. 25 The Acting
Border Control Commissioner attributes the overall decline to the
Trump administration’s immigration policies. 26According to the
Acting Commissioner, these policies “enabled authorities to
quickly deport ‘95 percent’ of the migrants encountered along the
U.S.-Mexico border, including tens of thousands of Central American asylum seekers who have been sent to Mexican border towns
to await their U.S. court hearings.” 27
In fact, nearly one half of the estimated eleven million undocumented immigrants in the country flew in on a visa, passed
an inspection at the airport, and then stayed in the country illegally. 28 However, this pattern may be changing: while people detained during “overstays” were far more common than border apprehensions between 2015 and 2018, cross-border migration
surged in 2019 and was on track to outstrip visa overstays. 29

Department of Homeland Security. The Administration has diverted the remaining
funds from the Department of Defense National Emergency Funding ($3.6 billion
with a planned $3.7 billion in additional funding) and routine appropriations for the
Department of Defense ($2.5 billion with a planned $3.5 billion in additional
funding). Id.
25. Abigail Hauslohner, U.S.-Mexico Crossings Continue to Drop, but Number of
Mexican Migrants Surges, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2020, 4:02 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/us-mexico-border-crossings-continueto-drop-but-mexican-migrants-surging/2020/02/11/fc797a4e-4cfb-11ea-b7219f4cdc90bc1c_story.html (“The number of migrants taken into custody along the
U.S.-Mexico border declined for an eighth straight month in January. . . . [but] the
number of Mexican adults taken into custody has climbed 32 percent”).
26. Hauslohner, supra note 25; see also Ordway, supra note 9 (“Over the years, the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security has cited reductions in border apprehensions
as evidence of the barrier’s effectiveness. It offers this example: When it installed
fencing near Yuma, Arizona, the number of people caught crossing the border
without permission plunged 90%.”) (citing Walls Work, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.
(Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2108/12/12/walls-work.
27. Hauslohner, supra note 25.
28. Miriam Jordan, The Overlooked Undocumented Immigrants: From India,
China, Brazil, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/01/us
/undocumented-visa-overstays.html; see Ordway, supra note 9.
29. See Blas Nuñez-Neto, Visa Overstays Outsize Role in Unauthorized Migration,
HARVARD KENNEDY SCH. BELFER CTR. (Sept. 2019), https://www.belfercenter.org
/sites/default/files/files/publication/HSP%20Paper%20SeriesVisa%20Overstays_0.pdf;
see also Ordway, supra note 9.
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One difficulty understanding the seriousness of the problem
is that U.S. Customs and Border Protection has not developed
any “metrics” to assess the effectiveness of the border barriers. 30
Yet, according to a 2017 report prepared by the U.S. Government
Accountability Office, the agency spent approximately $2.3 billion
from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2015 on fencing costs,
and in 2009, estimated that simply maintaining the fence over
the next twenty years would cost more than $1 billion. 31 A researcher at the University of Illinois at Chicago found that, each
quarter, 41,500 Mexican migrants are deterred from entering by
the barrier and the cost of each deterred migrant was approximately $4,820. 32 Additionally, the National Bureau of Economic
Research found that the physical barriers on the southwestern
border had only a “small” impact on curbing migration from Mexico to the U.S. 33 Researchers from Dartmouth College and Stanford University found that the Secure Fence Act (legislation that
authorized the construction of over 500 miles of fencing) reduced
the number of Mexican nationals living in the U.S. from 2005 and
2015 by an estimated 46,459 people, which amounted to approximately five percent of the actual decline in migration during that
period. 34 Even extending the barrier along the entire border
would have only reduced migration “by an estimated 129,438
people, which, the researchers note, ‘still comprises a small portion (13%) of the observed decline in migration flows between
2005 and 2015.’” 35
The construction of the border wall has had another consequence: the death of migrants attempting to cross illegally into

30. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-331, Southwest Border Security:
Additional Actions Needed to Better Assess Fencing’s Contributions to Operations and
Provide Guidance for Identifying Capability Gaps (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets
/690/682838.pdf; see also Ordway, supra note 9.
31. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-331, Southwest Border Security:
Additional Actions Needed to Better Assess Fencing’s Contributions to Operations and
Provide Guidance for Identifying Capability Gaps (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets
/690/682838.pdf.
32. Ordway, supra note 9 (citing Benjamin Feigenberg, Fenced Out: Why
Rising Migration Costs Matter, SEMANTIC SCHOLAR (Oct. 26, 2013),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d8b9/5f0ac5098cbc43aa219065dc73c295e068af.pdf.
33. Treb Allen et al., Border Walls, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RSCH. at 32 (Nov. 2019),
https://web.stanford.edu/~memorten/ewExternalFiles/Allen_Dobbin_Morten_Border
Walls.pdf.
34. Id.; see also Ordway, supra note 9.
35. Ordway, supra note 9 (citing Allen et al., supra note 33, at 32).
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the United States. 36 “Multiple studies over the years have found a
direct link between increased border security and migrant
deaths,” and indicate that increased border control causes migrants to seek entry from remote areas, increasing mortality. 37
Additionally, “segmented border militarization” has caused a
“funnel effect,” which redistributes the flow of migrants away
from what had been traditional “urban crossing points” to more
remote and dangerous areas. 38 Typical of these areas is the Sonoran desert in southern Arizona and Texas, which is characterized by rugged terrain, pronounced elevation changes, and relatively little rainfall, where temperatures can be as high as 120
degrees Fahrenheit in the summer and drop below freezing in the
winter. 39
III. EVOLUTION OF THE WAIVER AND ABRIDGED
JUDICIAL REVIEW PROVISIONS IN THE LAW
AUTHORIZING THE WALL’S CONSTRUCTION
The situation with respect to construction of the border wall
has evolved since 1996, when Congress granted the first authorization for the wall’s construction and conceived of the idea of
waiving applicable laws that might impede construction. 40 The
1996 version of § 102 of IIRIRA authorized the Attorney General
to waive provisions of the Endangered Species Act and the National Environmental Policy Act based on his determination that
these waivers were “necessary to ensure expeditious construction
of barriers and roads.” 41 However, in 1996, § 102(b) of IIRIRA only required construction of border fencing along a 14-mile region
near San Diego, California. 42 The Homeland Security Act of 2002
transferred this authority from the Attorney General to the Sec36. Id. (“The U.S. Border Patrol reported 300 deaths at the southwestern border
in fiscal year 2019, up slightly from 283 in fiscal year 2018 but considerably lower
than the decade high of 471 deaths in fiscal year 2012.”); see also id. (“Hundreds of
migrants die each year along the U.S.-Mexico border, particularly in southern
Arizona and Texas.”).
37. Id. (citing Daniel E. Martínez et al., Structural Violence and Migrant Deaths
in Southern Arizona, 2 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 257 (2018),
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/233150241400200401.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See generally Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-2008, § 102, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-554 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1103).
41. Id.
42. Id.
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retary of the Department of Homeland Security. 43 In 2005, Congress dramatically expanded the Secretary’s waiver power under
§ 102(c) of IIRIRA, granting the Secretary the authority to waive
“all legal requirements” that he determines necessary under his
sole discretion. 44
The 2005 amendment had another important consequence: it
largely insulated the Secretary’s waiver authority from judicial
review by restricting the scope of any challenge to any Secretarial
waiver decision, by ousting state court jurisdiction, and by giving
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear all causes or claims
arising from those waiver decisions. 45 The amendment further
protected Secretarial waivers by limiting challenges to only constitutional violations; 46 by requiring that those challenges be
filled no later than sixty days after issuance of the Secretary’s
waiver; 47 and by eliminating ordinary appellate review in the federal courts of appeal. 48 This restrictive judicial review provision
forces litigants to seek review of an adverse district court ruling
only by petitioning for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 49
Despite the significant changes to the judicial review and waiver
provisions of IIRIRA, the 2005 amendment did not change §
102(b)’s focus on the San Diego portion of the fence. 50 In 2006,
President Bush signed the Secure Fence Act 51 into law, which
significantly amended § 102(b) of IIRIRA. The Secure Fence Act
expanded the geographic range of the fence to 850 miles and put
construction under tight deadlines, calling for completion milestones in May and December 2008. 52 In 2008, Congress amended
43. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 101, 116 Stat. 2135
at 13 (2002).
44. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 102(c)(1), 119 Stat. 231, 302,
306 (2005) (emphasis added).
45. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 102(c)(2)(A), 119 Stat. 231,
302, 306 (2005).
46. See id.
47. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 102(c)(2)(B), 119 Stat. 231,
302, 306 (2005).
48. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 102(c)(2)(C), 119 Stat. 231,
302, 306 (2005).
49. See id.
50. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 102(b), 119 Stat. 231, 302, 306
(2005).
51. See generally Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, § 3, 120 Stat.
2638, 2369, § 102(b)(1)(A)(i)–(v).
52. See Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, § 3, 120 Stat. 2638, 2369,
§ 102(b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii).
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§ 102(b) again to require fencing “along not less than 700 miles of
the southwest border where fencing would be most practical and
effective.” 53 Before the Trump Administration took office, the government used the waiver authority under § 102(c) of IIRIRA five
times, all of them during the tenure of George W. Bush. 54 All of
the Bush Administration waivers applied to projects specifically
authorized by § 102(b) of IIRIRA. 55
On January 25, 2017, nine years after Congress last touched
IIRIRA, President Trump issued Executive Order 12767, authorizing the Secretary of Homeland Security to take steps to “obtain
complete operational control” of the Southern border, including
planning, designing, and constructing a physical wall “immediately.” 56 The Order defined the term “wall” as a “contiguous,
physical wall or a similarly secure, contiguous, and impassable
physical barrier.” 57 In response to that order, on August 2, 2017,
the Secretary of DHS issued a determination (“the San Diego
Waiver”) authorizing construction of three border wall projects
near San Diego, California, including replacement of fencing and
construction of prototype walls. 58 In his determination, the Secretary waived application of more than thirty laws, including the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered
Species Act (ESA), the entire Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), and the American Religious Freedom Act (ARFA), together with all state and local laws related to the subjects covered by
the laws listed. 59 A little over a month later, the Secretary issued
a second determination (“the Calexico Waiver”) on September 12,
2017, again waiving many federal and state laws that otherwise
would have applied with respect to construction of replacement
fencing along a three mile segment of the border near Calexico,
California. 60 Critics and adverse litigants, however, have contin53. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 564, 121 Stat.
1844, 2090, § 102(b)(1)(A)–(B).
54. Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Issues Waiver to Expedite Border
Construction Project in New Mexico (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018
/01/23/dhs-issues-waiver-expedite-border-construction-project-new-mexico
55. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 2018 WL 4105818, at *6–7 (2018), https://www.biologicaldiversity.org
/campaigns/border_wall/pdfs/ALDF-Petition.pdf.
56. Exec. Order No. 13767 §4, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017).
57. Id. at 8793, 8794.
58. See 82 Fed. Reg. 35984-01 (Aug. 2, 2017).
59. See generally id.
60. See 82 Fed. Reg. 42829-02 (Sept. 12, 2017).
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ued to point out that the waivers will continue to apply to upkeep
and maintenance costs in perpetuity, even after construction of
the barriers is complete. 61
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE WALL’S CONSTRUCTION ON
THE ENVIRONMENT AND AFFECTED TRIBES
The wall will have an adverse environmental impact on native animal and plant species, and will have concordant impacts
on the ecotourism industry in the Southwest. It will also severely
interfere with tribal communities and cultural resources on both
sides of the border.
A. PROJECTED ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS FROM WALL
CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE
The environmental impact of the projects authorized by the
San Diego and Calexico Waivers is extensive. The proposed wall
segments are within or close to the habitats of rare animal and
plant species, including the burrowing owl, Quino checkerspot
butterfly, Tecate cypress, snowy plover, two species of fairy
shrimp, and the Otay Mesa mint. 62 The Tijuana River National
Estuarine Research Reserve will also be affected. 63 The Reserve
“is designated a ‘Wetland of International Importance’ under the
1971 International Convention on Wetlands.” 64 “The Tijuana River estuary is one of only two intact estuaries in California, and it
provides productive marsh habitat for a range of invertebrates,
fish, birds, and plants.” 65 A portion of the affected area also falls
within California’s coastal zone, which authorizes the state to
promulgate regulations to ensure that coastal resources and uses
are protected. 66 The San Diego Waiver eliminates all of these protections. 67
Once built, the wall will prevent the regular passage of many
mammals, including jaguars, which only recently have reestab-

61. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *7, *11, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 139 S. Ct. 594 (2018) (No. 18-247), 2018 WL 4105818.
62. See id. at *9.
63. See id.
64. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *9, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 139 S. Ct. 594 (2018) (No. 18-247), 2018 WL 4105818.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
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lished habitat on the United States side of the border. 68 A 2017
Center for Biological Diversity study reported that ninety-three
endangered or threatened species could be harmed if the proposed
additional sections of the wall are built or improved. 69 The National Butterfly Center also filed suit in protest to construction of
the wall through their 100-acre property which, if completed,
would render as much as 70% of it inaccessible.70
The economic impact from reduced tourism in the area due
to the decline in species will likely be severe. 71 Local towns will
lose revenues from the decline in tourism, as well as touristrelated services, including lodging, food, and guides. 72 This loss in
revenues will be permanent with no alternative source of comparable revenue on the horizon.
B. IMPACT ON TRIBES
Besides negatively affecting a wide variety of species and environmental resources, the wall may harm members of several
Indian tribes who occupy land on both sides of the border. For example, the barriers have adversely affected civil and property
rights of the Tohono O’odham Nation, the Pascua Yaqui Tribe in
Arizona, the Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas, and other federally recognized tribes. 73 The barriers have kept tribal members
from accessing the southern parts of their land.74 The barriers also

68. NOAH GREENWALD ET AL., CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, A WALL IN THE
WILD: THE DISASTROUS IMPACTS OF TRUMP’S BORDER WALL ON WILDLIFE 13-15
(May 2017), https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/international/borderlands_
and_boundary_waters/pdfs/A_Wall_in_the_Wild.pdf.
69. Id.
70. Matthew S. Schwartz, Butterflies vs. Border Wall: National Butterfly Center
Seeks Restraining Order, NPR (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/13
/694173820/butterflies-v-border-wall-national-butterfly-center-seeks-restrainingorder.
71. See April Reese, ‘People Think It’s Not Safe’: Nature Tourism Takes Hit Over
Trump Wall Policy, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com
/us-news/2019/mar/22/texas-nature-tourism-industry-trump-border-wall (discussing
the economic benefits of regional tourism and the adverse impacts the border wall’s
construction is having on tourism numbers).
72. See id.
73. See Joseph Kowalski, Imaginary Lines, Real Consequences: The Effect of the
Militarization of the United States- Mexico Border on Indigenous Peoples, 5 AM.
INDIAN. L.J. 643, 651–52, 656 (2017); see also Ordway, supra note 9.
74. Kowalski, supra note 73, at 643, 653; see also Ordway, supra note 9.
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impede the sharing of customs and have led to the desecration of burial sites.75
The impact could be particularly devastating for native people whose cultural traditions depend on crossing the border. For
instance, some tribe members who live on the United States side
of the border depend on their tribal elders, who live on the Mexican side of the border, to teach their youth about their culture. 76
Additionally, some U.S. tribal members need to cross the border
into the Mexican desert to gather plants and other materials important for cultural rituals. 77 These members can be prevented
from traveling to those areas or from returning with those items
when “overzealous border guards mistake them for forbidden
plants.” 78 Furthermore, “tens of thousands of U.S. tribal members
live in the Mexican states of Coahuila, Chihuahua, Baja California and Sonora . . . [and] routinely cross the U.S.-Mexico border
for cultural, ceremonial or social purposes.” 79 They are considered
to be “visitors” to the U.S. and are required “to pass through security checkpoints, where they can be interrogated, rejected or delayed.” 80
The Tohono O’odham Nation, in particular, may be significantly affected. Sections of the border wall will run through sixtytwo miles of the Tohono O’odham Nation’s 2.8 million acre reservation between Arizona and Mexico. 81 Tightening of border security and immigration policies have infringed on the Nation’s “mobile way of life” and its sovereignty. 82 If these barriers are
constructed on Tohono O’odham lands, the Nation will be irreparably harmed as a result of the injury done to sacred lands and
environmental resources, as well as from the curtailment of the
75. Kowalski, supra note 73, at 654-55.
76. Id. at 656.
77. Id. at 654.
78. Id.
79. Ordway, supra note 9 (citing Christina Leza, For Native Americans, USMexico Border is an ‘Imaginary Line’, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 19, 2019),
https://theconversation.com/for-native-americans-us-mexico-border-is-an- imaginaryline-111043).
80. Id.
81. Ordway, supra note 9 (citing Keegan C. Tasker, Waived: The Detrimental
Implications of U.S. Immigration and Border Security Measures on Southern Border
Tribes, 8 AM. INDIAN L.J. 303 (2019)).
82. Keegan C. Tasker, Waived: The Detrimental Implications of U.S. Immigration
and Border Security Measures on Southern Border Tribes, 8 AM. INDIAN L.J. 303, 318
(2019).
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Nation’s mobility and sovereignty. Additionally, the effects of
construction may strip tribal lands of sacred natural resources
that are important to the Nation for spiritual and cultural practices. 83
The border wall appears to be making only a slight dent in
the flow of illegal migrants into the United States, at a high cost
in human life and dollars. Its expansion will substantially harm
native plants and animals, causing a loss of tourism dollars in
border towns and an irreplaceable loss in biodiversity. It will diminish native cultures, which thrive on both sides of the border.
These impacts have spurred a multitude of lawsuits against the
fence seeking to halt its construction, and even to dismantle what
has been built, as discussed in the next section.
V. THE STATUS OF VARIOUS LAWSUITS AGAINST THE
WALL’S CONSTRUCTION
At the time of writing this article, there were eight lawsuits
pending against the wall’s construction. 84 They contain a mix of
constitutional, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and environmental claims. Included in this mix of cases are those brought by
tribes on both sides of the border, seeking relief under international agreements. Unfortunately for groups hoping to halt or reverse border wall construction, none of these cases has advanced
very far. 85 Two similar cases brought by environmental plaintiffs
83. Id.
84. Most of the pending litigation challenges the appropriation of funds for the
border wall, sometimes in conjunction with environmental claims. See Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. Trump, 453 F. Supp. 3d 11, 23 (D.D.C. 2020); Washington v.
Trump, 441 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1106-07 (W.D. Wash. 2020); Sierra Club v. Trump, 379
F. Supp. 3d 883, 908 (N.D. Cal 2019); El Paso Cnty. v. Trump, 408 F. Supp. 3d 840,
844 (W.D. Tex. 2019); U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 379 F. Supp. 3d 8,
11 (D.D.C. 2019); California v. Trump, 407 F. Supp. 3d 869, 879 (N.D. Cal. 2019);
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Esper, No. 1:20-cv-02130 (D.D.C. filed May 12, 2020).
Another case takes a different approach, instead challenging whether the
government fulfilled its obligations under FOIA. See Ctr. for Investigative Reporting
v. U.S. Customs and Border Prot., 436 F. Supp. 3d 90, 96 (D.D.C. 2019) (seeking
records under FOIA related to border wall construction).
85. For example, most of the challenges to the waiver provisions have thus far
failed. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. McAleenan, 404 F. Supp. 3d 218, 235
(D.D.C. 2019) (challenging the constitutionality of IIRIRA’s waiver provisions); in re
Border Infrastructure Env’t Litig., 284 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1103 (S.D. Cal. 2018)
(challenging the constitutionality of IIRIRA’s waiver provisions); N. Am. Butterfly
Ass’n v. Nielsen, 368 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2019) (granting the government’s
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S.
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demonstrate just how difficult challenging the border wall in
court has been.
First, a group of environmental organizations (including the
Center for Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife, and the Animal Legal Defense Fund), as well as the State of California, sued
the DHS, alleging three constitutional and one statutory violations. 86 The Southern District of California granted the government’s motion for summary judgment, rejecting plaintiffs’ nondelegation, Presentment Clause, and ‘Take Care’ Clause
arguments. 87
With respect to the plaintiffs’ unconstitutional delegation
claim, the District Court held that IIRIRA § 102 provided the Secretary with an “intelligible principle” enabling him to exercise his
delegated waiver authority. 88 While the court acknowledged that
§ 102(c) contained fewer details than other statutes that had been
challenged on similar grounds, the section articulated a sufficient
limit on the Secretary’s authority, as his authority was limited to
laws whose elimination was necessary to ensure expeditious construction of barriers and roads. 89 The court also concluded that
the waivers were sufficiently narrow in scope as the authority
was granted only for the purpose of building border barriers authorized under § 102(c) and consistent with congressional intent,
thereby vitiating any Presentment Clause claim. 90 The court also
noted that the waived statutes “largely retained legal force and
effect” because the waivers only “disturbed” them “for a specific

Army Corps of Eng’rs, 405 F. Supp. 3d 127, 135 (D.D.C. 2019) (upholding the
government’s response to FOIA requests from the Center for Biological Diversity).
Even cases where the plaintiffs were victorious in lower courts have had little effect
on the wall’s construction, due to stays being issued by higher courts. See, e.g., Sierra
Club, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 908, stay issued 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019); El Paso Cnty., 408 F.
Supp. 3d at 844, stay issued No. 19- 51144 (5th Cir. Jan. 8, 2020).
86. See in re Border Infrastructure Env’t. Litig., 284 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1102 (S.D.
Cal. 2018). Environmental plaintiffs argued that they have a property and liberty
interest in ensuring that environmental laws and interest are protected, see id. at
1142–43, an argument not that dissimilar from one being made in the Juliana
appeal in the 9th Circuit. See Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir.
2020), petition for reh’g filed, No. 18-36082 (9th Cir. Mar. 2, 2020).
87. In re Border Infrastructure Env’t Litig., 284 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1103 (S.D. Cal.
2018).
88. Id. at 1134-35.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1141.
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purpose and for a specific time.” 91 While the court agreed that
the Take Care Clause applies to Executive officers, in this instance, the Secretary’s waivers were “plausibly called for by an
act of Congress,” and, therefore, did not violate the Take Care
Clause. 92 Plaintiffs also made an ultra vires claim—that the
waivers were beyond the scope of IIRIRA § 102(b)—which the
court agreed to rule on even though it arguably did not raise a
constitutional question. 93 The court then went on to reject the
claim, because nothing in IIRIRA § 102 places a “clear mandatory” limit on the Secretary’s waiver authority, robbing the waivers
as a basis for any ultra vires claim. 94
Under IIRIRA, only the Supreme Court can review the district court’s ruling on plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. 95 Accordingly, petitioners filed a certiorari petition seeking reversal of the
District Court’s opinion on August 23, 2018. 96 On December 3,
2018, the Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari, effectively affirming the District Court’s decision. 97 During the time
the waiver provision case was pending in the Supreme Court,
work began on a 30-foot high, 14-mile long fence construction and
replacement project in Calexico, California. 98
In 2019, the Center for Biological Diversity, Southwest Environmental Center, Defenders of Wildlife, and Animal Legal Defense Fund brought a similar case in the District of Columbia,
challenging DHS’s waiver of laws that would impede construction
of 145 miles of barrier wall. 99 In this case, the plaintiffs alleged
that DHS did not have the statutory authority to use its waiver
power because DHS failed to meet the procedural requirements of

91. In re Border Infrastructure Env’t Litig., 284 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1103 (S.D. Cal.
2018).
92. Id. at 1139.
93. Id. at 1115.
94. Id. at 1126–28.
95. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, Title I §102 (2005).
96. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 18-247, 2018 WL 4105818 at *34 (2018).
97. Animal League Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 139 S. Ct. 594
(2018).
98. Kate Morrissey, Border Fence Replacement Hailed by Trump is Completed in
Calexico, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-metrump-border-barrier-20181011-story.html.
99. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. McAleenan, 404 F. Supp. 3d 218, 224-25 (D.D.C.
2019).

2021]

“Something There Is that Doesn’t Love a Wall”

29

§ 102(b). 100 The Court rejected this argument on the grounds that
§ 102(c) limited its authority to only adjudicating constitutional
challenges to the border wall. 101 The plaintiffs’ constitutional
claims—that the waiver provision violated the Take Care Clause,
the Presentment Clause, and the nondelegation doctrine—were
also rejected by the Court.102
As required by § 102(c) of IIRIRA, the plaintiffs filed a petition
for certiorari on January 31, 2020, against the Acting Secretary of
DHS.103 La Union del Pueblo Entero, the North American Butterfly
Association, and the National Butterfly Center, Archaeology
Southwest, and several local governments filed amicus curiae briefs
in support of the petitioner. 104
In their certiorari petition, petitioners noted that § 102(c) of
IIRIRA grants the Secretary of Homeland Security sweeping
powers, in his “sole discretion,” to waive any and all legal requirements, including state and tribal requirements, that would
otherwise apply to the construction, replacement, and upkeep of
barriers, including prototype barriers, along the U.S.-Mexico border that would impede their “expeditious construction.” 105 Petitioners argued that this authority, coupled with language limiting
judicial review to constitutional challenges and appellate review
to seeking certiorari in the Supreme Court (§ 102(c)(2)(A)), violated the separation of powers doctrine. 106 Petitioners also contended that the waiver authority under § 102(c) violated the nondelegation doctrine, as well as the Presentment Clause, to the extent that the section works as a partial repeal of enacted laws. 107
Petitioners contended that the fact that the section’s jurisdictionstripping provision shields presidents from judicial review of their
own actions makes the separation of powers violation more severe. 108 The petition also complained that the language of § 102(a)
100. Id. at 235.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 243-50.
103. Petitioners applied for an extension of the time within which to file their
petition on October 21, 2019, which the Chief Justice granted on October 29, 2019,
extending the original filing date of December 3, 2019 to February 1, 2020.
104. See No. 19-975, U.S. SUP. CT., https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?
filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/ public/19-975.html (last visited Dec. 24, 2020).
105. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Wolf,
141 S. Ct. 158 (2020) (No. 19-975), 2020 WL 584341.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 37–39.
108. Id. at 39.
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grants the Secretary of DHS wide discretion to determine what
the “actions” are that may be necessary to trigger the installation
of barriers to deter illegal crossings, as well as where the areas of
“high illegal entry” are to construct those barriers. 109 Without
reaching the merits of any of these allegations, the Court denied
cert. on June 29, 2020. 110
For those seeking to stop the wall’s construction, clearly, another approach is needed. Rather than describe the status of the
remaining lower court cases involving the wall’s construction or
evaluating the arguments made in these various cases, this article examines the extent to which the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment and the unenumerated rights language of the Ninth
Amendment provide any possible relief to claimants. It is to these
analyses that the article now turns.
VI. POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL CLAIMS AGAINST THE
STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION FOR CONSTRUCTING
THE WALL
There are three potential arguments for why legislation authorizing the wall’s construction is unconstitutional. First, that
the statute’s truncated judicial review procedures, which close off
intermediate appellate court review of failed legal challenges and
make a grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court the only potential avenue for review, violate the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment. Second, that the statute’s waiver procedures, which
eliminate protections under existing laws for endangered and rare species, contravene the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of unenumerated rights to cultural enjoyment. A third potential challenge is to the wall itself, namely, that it violates the
unenumerated right of citizens to travel, including members of
tribes who live on both sides of the wall, in violation of the Ninth
Amendment.
A. THE PETITION CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
“One need not call oneself an originalist to acknowledge that
historical fit has a place in constitutional interpretation.” 111

109. Id. at 2-3.
110. See Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Wolf, 141 S. Ct. 158 (2020).
111. Mitchell Gordon, Getting to the Bottom of the Ninth: Continuity, Discontinuity,
and the Rights Retained by the People, 50 IND. L. REV. 421, 463 (2017).
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The Petition Clause of the First Amendment guarantees judicial review of citizen grievances against the government. 112 By
cutting off appellate review of challenges to waivers of environmental laws, section 102(c) of IIRIRA violates the First Amendment’s Petition Clause. “Despite its modern obscurity, the petition right is in fact the most ancient of the First Amendment’s
guarantees.” 113 Petitioning government officials to complain
about grievances was “a well-established right and practice, both
in England and the American colonies, well before the American
Revolution.”114 “[T]he right to petition evolved in both England
and America into a broad right which was distinct from and superior to the rights of speech, press, and assembly.” 115 In fact, the
associated rights of speech, press, and assembly emerged later
than the right to petition. 116 Petitioning can include written requests from individuals or groups which are then submitted to
any of the three branches of government. 117 In contrast to the
rights of speech and the press, the contents of petitions are not
112. See Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government
for Redress of Grievances, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 45 (1993) (“In NAACP v.
Button, [t]he Court emphasized that NAACP-sponsored litigation was a ‘form of
political expression’ and was very possibly the only avenue by which minority groups
could petition government for redress of grievances.”).
113. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV.
1097, 1109 (2016); see also id. at 1111 (“[W]hat we find through a close examination
of the First Amendment as a whole is that each of the five rights protected by the
nonreligious parts of the Amendment—freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
assembly, association, and petition—are important, independent rights with distinct
histories. What they have in common, however, is that each of the rights has as its
primary goal the advancement of democratic self-governance. Each, moreover,
provides a distinct path for citizens to participate in and influence their
government.”).
114. Id. at 1109-10; see also Spanbauer, supra note 112, at 28 (“By the time of the
American Revolution, Delaware, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
and Vermont also provided explicit protection for the right of colonists to petition
local governing bodies for redress of both individual and collective grievances. Thus,
the early colonial governments recognized petitioning as a tangible right.”) (internal
citations omitted).
115. Spanbauer, supra note 112, at 68.
116. Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law Abridging . . .”: An Analysis of the
Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153, 1168
(1986). Indeed, Smith attributes the right to assemble to the right to petition, as the
former was not yet seen to be a constitutional right when petitioning had long been
accepted. Id. at 1169 (“What develops as an accepted or even tolerated practice often
is transmuted into a right. Such appears to have been the case with public assembly,
and petitioning likely was the activity that brought about the practice of publicly
assembling.”).
117. Spanbauer, supra note 112, at 68.
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restricted. 118 Though the precise extent of the petition right has
yet to be clarified by the Supreme Court, the right to petition the
government likely includes the right to petition a court for relief
from a grievance.
1. BACKGROUND
Petitions are an important way to inform the government of
grievances held by citizens. Before the advent of the administrative state, they were an important source of information for the
government about how citizens felt about certain issues outside of
the election cycle. 119 The Petition Clause of the First Amendment
“guarantees that people may bring their causes to the government without fear of reprisal.” 120 Norman Smith believes that the
development of petitioning in constitutional jurisprudence is
closely related to the concept of popular sovereignty. 121 For example, in early America, even women, free blacks, and enslaved persons could petition, despite the fact that their other rights were
extremely limited. 122
In England and colonial America, petitions were not considered “publications” that could trigger the application of libel laws. 123
Because of their perceived importance, petitioners who presented
petitions to a court received immunity from libel charges regardless
of whether the dispute triggering the petition concerned public, private, or commercial matters,124 unless the litigation was “base118. Id. For example, seditious libel laws limit the right to free speech, and the
government can restrict the number of people who can assemble and require
participants to “act in a peaceful, orderly manner.” Id.
119. See Constitutional Law—First Amendment—Tenth Circuit Holds That Petition
Clause Protection Cannot Extend to Nonpetitioners, 114 HARV. L. REV. 654, 658
(2000).
120. Constitutional Law—First Amendment—Tenth Circuit Holds That Petition
Clause Protection Cannot Extend to Nonpetitioners, 114 HARV. L. REV. 654, 657
(2000).
121. Smith, supra note 116, at 1153; see also id. at 1196 (“Petitioning historically
and textually is a separable right from speech and press, and the interests served by
petitioning go to the very heart of the principle of popular sovereignty. For these
reasons, petitioning must be regarded as an extremely valuable right.”).
122. Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law Abridging . . .”: An Analysis of the
Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153, 1172
(1986).
123. Spanbauer, supra note 112, at 38.
124. Id. at 63 (1993); but see id. at 52 (“Petitioners were historically protected from
both seditious libel prosecutions and private libel actions. The Supreme Court has
ignored this history and has applied the same qualified immunity given speech and
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less.”125 Although many individuals were punished for written or
verbal speech under the Sedition Act of 1789, not a single petitioner
was punished. 126 Julie M. Spanbauer argues that the protection of
petitioners from libel laws shows a lack of intent to bring freedom of
speech and the press to the same level of protection as the right to
petition, as neither the free speech nor press clauses protected individuals from charges of libel.127
The special status of petitions throughout American history
means that limits that are commonly placed on free speech and
freedom of the press must be looked at critically before being applied to core petitioning activities like drafting, circulating or presenting a petition. 128 The highest level of protection should be applied to these activities, although the less demanding standard of
protection applied to freedoms of speech, the press, and assembly,
should be applied to publicizing the content of a petition or holding a public meeting where a petition is discussed. 129 Where a petition affects only the public interest, petitioning should only be
restricted in situations where there is a “clear and present danger
the press to the information contained in petitions. As a result, petitioners receive
less protection than is historically justified.”).
125. Id. at 52 (1993). But “petitioners were not clothed with immunity if they
published the content of their petition in a newspaper or in some other written
communication.” Id. at 55.
126. Id. at 39.
127. Spanbauer, supra note 112; see also Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to
Court under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO
ST. L.J. 557, 673 (1999) (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (saying that,
although freedom of speech and the press are cognate rights and have overlapping
functions, they are not the same and the history of protecting government access
through petitioning is longer than the history of protecting speech)); Aaron H.
Caplan, The First Amendment’s Forgotten Clauses, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 532, 552
(2014) (quoting Thomas, 323 U.S. 516 (“It was not by accident or coincidence that the
rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the
rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances.
All these, though not identical, are inseparable. They are cognate rights, and
therefore are united in the First Article’s assurance.”)).
128. Smith, supra note 116, at 1196; see also id. at 1158–59 (describing a 1648
Parliament ordinance limiting to twenty the number of people who could present a
petition to Parliament and also requiring that the presentation of the petition must
“be in a peaceful and orderly manner,” which was the first statute in England that
recognized petitioning as a “fundamental right.”); id. at 1159 (“[T]he essential
features of the ordinance of 1648 were reenacted in 1661, as the Act 13 Car. II, Stat.
I, c. 5, which is still on the statute books of Great Britain.”).
129. Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law Abridging . . .”: An Analysis of the
Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153, 1196
(1986).
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to public order or national security.”130 But these are minimal and
reasonable restrictions on this important constitutional right.
2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A First Amendment petition is a distinct type of communication between a citizen and her political representative that is neither “discourse [n]or deliberation,” but rather a precursor of
hoped-for action. 131 Scholars consider petitioning “part of the ‘fabric’ of English constitutional law” and to be of sufficient importance that it was among the fundamental rights the English
citizenry demanded of William and Mary in the 1689 Bill of
Rights.” 132 The 1689 English Bill of Rights also made prosecution
of petitioners illegal, indicating the importance of the activity. 133
Before that, petitioning for redress of the sovereign’s action had a
toehold in the 1215 Magna Carta to the extent that any assemblage of four barons could ask the King to correct promptly any
improper actions committed by his agents. 134 By the midfourteenth century, petitions were filed in Parliament as opposed
to with the King. 135 In many of England’s colonies in America, the
right to petition Parliament or the King for redress of grievances
was guaranteed by their respective colonial charters. 136 Many colonial charters also included procedures for petitioning or protec-

130. Id. at 1197; see also Spanbauer, supra note 112, at 16 n.3 (“[A] restricted view
of petitioning under the First Amendment does not accord with the importance given
the right in a series of late 19th and early 20th century Supreme Court cases. See
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872) (right to petition a
privilege and immunity of national citizenship); Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,
207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907) (right of access to courts, as component of right to petition
government, also a privilege and immunity of national citizenship); see also Crandell
[sic] v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867) (stating that a citizen’s right to
petition is correlative to the plenary powers granted the federal government).”).
131. Bhagwat, supra note 113, at 1117.
132. Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court under the Petition Clause of the
First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 599–600 (1999).
133. See id. at 600.
134. Aaron H. Caplan, The First Amendment’s Forgotten Clauses, 63 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 532, 545 (2014).
135. Id. (“King Edward III opened each Parliament with an announcement of the
King’s willingness to hear petitions from the people. As Parliament itself grew in
power over the centuries, the petitions began to be directed directly to it.”). See also
id. (“Even today, a bag hangs on the back of the Speaker’s chair in the House of
Commons where members may deposit petitions from constituents.”).
136. Andrews, supra note 132, at 603.
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tions for the act of petitioning, 137 and when the first Congress was
assembled in 1789, within ten days, petitions began arriving,
without the benefit of the Petition Clause of the First Amendment. 138 The 1765 Stamp Act stated that “it is the right of the
British subjects in these colonies, to petition the King or either
House of Parliament,” and the fact that the royal government ignored these petitions led colonists to “complain in the Declaration
of Independence that the King had answered their previous petitions ‘only by repeated Injury.’” 139
“The drafters of the Bill of Rights replaced the right to petition the legislature, which was the supreme power in the states,
with the right to petition the whole ‘government’—which possessed all of the powers of the federal government.” 140 James
Madison, who wrote the initial version of the Bill of Rights, included a first draft of the Petition Clause. 141 He wrote that “[t]he
people shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling and
consulting for their common good; nor from applying to the Legislature by petitions, or remonstrances, for redress of their grievances.’” 142
Madison viewed the right to petition “as part of the system
by which the First Amendment would guard the people’s right to

137. Id. at 604 (“The 1641 Massachusetts Bay Colony Body of Liberties guaranteed
a very broad right of petition that expressly encompassed the right to file complaints
in local courts: ‘Every man, whether Inhabitant or Sorreiner, free or not free, shall
have libertie to come to any publique Court, Councel or Towne meeting, and either
by speech or writeing, to move any lawfull, seasonable and materiall question, or to
present any necessary motion, complaint, petition, Bill or information, whereof that
meeting hath proper cognizance, so it be done in convenient time, due order and,
respective manner.’”).
138. Caplan, supra note 134, at 546.
139. Andrews, supra note 132, at 603–04; see also Smith, supra note 110, at 1173
(“The Declaration of Independence, which accused the king of trampling upon many
liberties of the colonists, did not claim that petitioning itself had been punished, only
that the petitions had not met with favorable response: ‘In every state of these
Oppressions we have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated
Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury.”).
140. Andrews, supra note 132, at 611–12.
141. Id. at 612–13.
142. Id. See also Smith, supra note 116, at 1182 (“Only one amendment of the text
of the first amendment significantly affected the petition clause: the word ‘petition’
was substituted for the words ‘apply to.’ Although no statement of intent
accompanied this change of language, the substituted term’s well established
common law and historical meaning as an absolute right is properly incorporated
into the first amendment.”).
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‘communicate their will’ to their government.”143 This distinguished the right to petition from the right of free speech in two
ways. First, the right to petition preserves the right to speak to
the government, not just to speak in general, and, second, to seek
redress of grievances beyond merely stating views about something. 144 The latter difference gives aggrieved individuals an opportunity to seek a legal and peaceful alternative to “self-help and
force,” and gave a sense of “justice and order in their government.” 145 But the right to petition imposed no obligation of the
government to respond to a petition – then or now.146
According to Carol Rice Andrews, any duty to respond lies in
the courts and stems from the Due Process Clause, not the Petition Clause. 147 But even if there is no duty to respond, the Petition Clause informs the government of citizen grievances and
gives citizens access to government to express their grievances. It
also creates a chance that a petitioner might get relief in a governmental system that otherwise would not give them that opportunity outside of the courts. 148
3. DIFFERING VIEWS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PETITION
CLAUSE
Julie M. Spanbauer disagrees with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the Petition Clause, which largely ignores its existence and deemphasizes its importance. Spanbauer argues that
“the right to petition was cut from a different cloth than were the
cognate rights of speech, press, and assembly.” 149 She maintains
that the right to petition, historically, “was a distinct right, supe-

143. Andrews, supra note 132, at 624.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 635–36; see also id. at 638–39 (“James Madison broadly stated that “the
people have a right to express and communicate their sentiments and wishes”
through various means including ‘by petition to the whole body,’ but he did not say
that Congress must specifically respond to each of these views.”); id. at 667 (“There is
some historical basis for concluding that the right to petition extends only as far as
the power of the federal courts, as granted both by Article III and by Congress.”).
147. Andrews, supra note 132, at 645. See also id. at 646–47 (“The Petition Clause,
with all of its attendant ‘strict scrutiny’ protections under the First Amendment,
protects the initial filing of the complaint, and the Due Process Clause, and its
somewhat lower ‘reasonableness’ standard of protection, steps in from that point
forward.”).
148. Id. at 636.
149. Spanbauer, supra note 112, at 17.
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rior to the other expressive rights.” 150 Over time, the right to petition one’s government evolved “in both England and America into
a superior expressive right that was subject to few restrictions,”
compared to the “corollary rights of speech, press, and assembly,”
which all suffered heavier legal burdens. 151 Indeed, some argue
that petitioning nurtured the previously-unrecognized rights of
freedom of the press and assembly. 152 Norman B. Smith stated
that the failure to recognize petitioning activity when it occurs
and the failure to protect that activity, forfeits “peoples’ expressive rights.” 153
Ashutosh Bhagwat refers to the First Amendment as the
“Democratic First Amendment,” saying that it should be interpreted as adopting Thomas Jefferson’s democratic republican philosophy. In this philosophy, citizens should be involved in a multiplicity of activities in which they engage and even challenge
their elected officials by communicating their values and beliefs
“jointly” through assemblies and associations.154 Thus, petitioning
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Smith, supra note 116, at 1166–67; see also Spanbauer, supra note 112, at 41–
42, n.192 (citations omitted) (“Given the final punctuation of the First Amendment, it
is important to understand the link the Framers made not only between assembly
and petition but also between assembly and speech. In both the House and the
Senate, the early versions of the First Amendment the Speech, Press, Assembly, and
Petition Clauses were separated by a comma; the conjunctive ‘and’ was used to
separate the last two clauses. Very late in the formulation process and without any
record of discussion, however, semicolons were substituted for the commas and the
disjunctive ‘or’ was substituted for the conjunctive ‘and’ between the Speech and
Press Clauses. The rights of assembly and petition remained separated by a comma
and the conjunctive ‘and.’”); but see Spanbauer, supra note 96, at 41 (“The debates
over the Petition Clause make clear that assembly was often a necessary component
to the creation of collective petitions. The debates also indicate that the Framers
wanted to ensure the assembly right in order to make meaningful the right of
collective petition.”).
153. Smith, supra note 116, at 1196. See also id. at 1188 (“Most of the limitations
that have been imposed on speech and the press, whatever their justifications in the
contexts of these expressive rights, are inappropriate restrictions upon petitioning.”).
154. Bhagwat, supra note 113, at 1099–2000. He complains that the Court’s
modern First Amendment Jurisprudence is “a series of opinions interpreting the
Religion and Free Speech Clauses, which ignores the rest of the Amendment’s
protections for the Press, Assembly, and Petition.” Id. at 1097–98; see also id. at 1112
(“These rights [assembly and petition] are “cognate” because they are similar in
nature and share common roots [with speech and press] . . ., and they are ‘democratic
freedoms’ because their common nature is that they all advance democratic selfgovernance.”); id. at 1118 (“I have emphasized the fact that the rights of association,
assembly, and petition are as important as speech and the press to an effective
democracy, and that all of these rights share common roots and purposes. They are
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offers a means for citizens to bring their problems to the attention
of government and provides a source of information for the government about what people are thinking about how the government is conducting public business. 155 Petitions can shine a spotlight on government incompetence and misconduct and present a
way to measure the degree to which citizens approve of a current
government and whether it should be kept in office. 156 Failure to
appreciate and protect the right to petition has, at various times,
led to popular discontent, and attempts to restrict the “time,
place, and manner” for filing petitions have largely failed.157
Scholars like Spanbauer are critical of the Court for collapsing “the historically superior right to petition into the other historically inferior rights of the First Amendment,”158 and for mistakenly concluding that the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment does not offer a “substantive right of access to the
courts unless free speech rights are also implicated.” 159 On the
point of whether the government has an obligation to respond to
petitions, courts and scholars are divided.160 Spanbauer claims
that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, which does not require
the government to listen to individuals or respond to grievances,
distinct rights but, as the Supreme Court has said, ‘cognate.’ To say that they are
distinct, however, is not to say they are unrelated. To the contrary, these rights
usually operate in combination with one another, and are much more effective in
combination as well.”).
155. Smith, supra note 116, at 1179.
156. Id.
157. Smith, supra note 116, at 1179; see also Spanbauer, supra note 112, at 37
(“The revolutionary movement utilized the doctrine of seditious libel as its tool for
suppressing critical political speech. In comparison, the right to petition was far less
restricted and was the only authorized means by which individuals could speak out
against governmental action.”).
158. Spanbauer, supra note 112, at 68; see also id. at 42–43 (“The Supreme Court
has unfortunately failed to recognize either legitimate petitioning activity or the
superior status historically afforded petitioning. As a result, the Court has refused to
distinguish petitioning from speech and has refused to afford petitioning the
appropriate level of constitutional protection.”).
159. Spanbauer, supra note 112, at 68.
160. Id. at 68–69; see also id. at 38 (“The right to petition consisted of a right to
complain and a concomitant right to receive a response.”); id. at 49 (“Congress did
agree, however, that the government was required to respond to petitions. Thus,
history clearly supports a First Amendment right of governmental consideration and
response. Contrary to historical understanding, the Supreme Court has clearly
stated that the First Amendment does not require the government to listen to
individuals or to respond to individual grievances.”). In fact, Spanbauer argues the
Court got it “backwards”—the development of the Petition Clause “preceded and
fostered the evolution of speech, assembly, and the press.” Id. at 68–69.
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is “[c]ontrary to historical understanding.” 161 Instead, according
to Spanbauer, it is “[c]onsistent with the original understanding”
of the Petition Clause that a petitioner would be entitled to a response, though not necessarily a positive one. 162 Spanbauer does
acknowledge that petitioners could not always be entitled to a
public hearing to address their grievances; such a requirement, as
noted by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Bi-Metallic v. Colorado Board of Equalization, would cause government “to grind to a
halt.” 163
On the other side of the debate, Aaron Caplan disagrees with
the prominence Spanbauer gives to the Petition Clause, noting
that the Court has not found that it protects any more than is already protected by the Speech Clause. 164 Caplan believes the
Court got it right in McDonald v. Smith, 165 when it stated the
right to petition is “‘cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of the First Amendment’ and as a result ‘there is no sound
basis for granting greater constitutional protection to statements
made in a petition to the President than other First Amendment
expression.’” 166 He also cites the 2011 decision in Borough of

161. Spanbauer, supra note 112, at 38; see id. at 50 (citing Smith v. Ark. Highway
Emps., 441 U.S. 463 (1979), where the Court found no violation of the Petition
Clause when the Commission did not act on or even consider those grievances
because the Commission had no First Amendment obligation to listen or respond to
them); accord Minn. Bd. for Cmtys. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984); see also
Smith, supra note 116, at 1175 (“Congress debated and rejected a motion to require
representatives to submit to instructions of the electorate. Congress generally
agreed, however, that popular opinion should be received and considered, and that
the right to petition for redress of grievances must be respected. This action
amounted to a formal acceptance of the tacit understanding that petitioners can
command the government’s reception of, but not its acquiescence in, their
petitions.”).
162. Spanbauer, supra note 112, at 51.
163. Id. at 50–51 (citing Bi-metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S.
441, 445 (1915)).
164. Caplan, supra note 134, at 547.
165. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
166. Caplan, supra note 134, at 547; but see supra note 119, at 658 (“In California
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, Justice Stewart, concurring, found
Noerr’s Petition Clause protection necessary “to preserve the informed operation of
governmental processes and to protect the right of petition guaranteed by the First
Amendment. Noerr and California Motor recognized that petitions may transmit to
the government the very information that guides its actions, and that the Clause’s
promise of an informed government can oblige the state to refrain from obstructing
the flow of petitions.”); Andrews, supra note 132, at 588 (“[I]n McDonald v. Smith,
472 U.S. 479 (1985), the Court broadly stated, also in dictum, that the Petition
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Duryea v. Guarnieri, 167 which found that the Petition Clause added nothing that the Speech Clause did not already provide, although he notes that the Court suggested in dicta that “the right
to petition might have independent force in as-yet-unrecognized
circumstances.” 168
4. PETITIONERS’ RIGHT TO SEEK RELIEF FROM A COURT FOR
THEIR GRIEVANCES
Many legal scholars have concluded that the Petition Clause
protects the right of a group of citizens or individual citizens to
take a grievance to court. 169 Considered by Andrews a “right conservative of all other rights,” and one that “lies at the foundation
of orderly government,” access to a court is “one of the highest
and most essential privileges of citizenship” that each state must
grant to citizens of other states in conformity with its own citizens. 170 However, while legal scholars may be of this mind, there
is little analysis by the Supreme Court on whether the Petition
Clause actually applies to the judicial branch, and so there is little “historical, textual or policy” support for this application. 171
The most that can be said, according to Carol Rice Andrews,
is that: “the history, text, and policies of the Clause are not inconsistent with an application of the right to petition to the
courts.” 172 She goes on to say that “a plausible argument can be
made that the Petition Clause does protect, at least to some de-

Clause protects civil court filings: ‘[F]iling a complaint in court is a form of
petitioning activity.’”).
167. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379 (2011).
168. Caplan, supra note 134 at 547–48.
169. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972) (“That
right, [the right of access to the courts] is part of the right of petition protected by the
First Amendment.”); see Andrews, supra note 126, at 563 (“In 1972, the Court
proclaimed in California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, that ‘[t]he right of
access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.’”); id. at 560 (“In
the wake of these due process decisions, the Petition Clause is becoming, slowly, the
best avenue for asserting a right of court access.”). Andrews is referring to Supreme
Court decisions holding that an ordinary person has no due process right to go to
court except in extraordinary circumstances. See id.; but see Spanbauer, supra note
112, at 46 (“A number of [lower] courts have concluded that the First Amendment
right to petition the judiciary is not a substantive constitutional right separate from
other First Amendment rights.”).
170. Andrews, supra note 132, at 566–67.
171. Id. at 592.
172. Id. at 595.
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gree, a person’s right to file a civil lawsuit.” 173 She bases this conclusion on the fact that the right to petition historically protected
requests for some form of individual redress, even if by the legislature. 174 Second, she contends that the actual text of the clause
extends the right to petition the ‘government’ and is not limited to
a particular branch. 175 Finally, she argues that “the policies
served by petitioning—citizen participation in government and
opportunity for peaceful resolution of grievances—apply to the
courts as well as to the other branches of government.” 176 But the
degree to which the Petition Clause guarantees court access for
petitioners is still an open issue.
Perhaps reflecting its uncertain opinion of the reach of the
Petition Clause, the Court has, on occasion, turned to the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a possible source for
the right to plead a grievance in court. 177 However, this line of
cases is of little use here, as they primarily concern cases where
the Court held that the plaintiffs had no due process right to
court access, 178 or involved assertion of a defendant’s rights once
in court, not the right to get into court ab initio. 179 The high level
of judicial scrutiny under the Due Process Clause also distinguishes cases brought under it from the cases relying on the Petition Clause on the issue of judicial access.180
173. Andrews, supra note 132, at 595.
174. Id.at 595–96.
175. Id. at 596.
176. Andrews, supra note 132, at 596; see id. at 623 (“First though the right to
petition started in England as a check on the King’s power, petitioning grew to serve
broader functions. It became a means by which all English subjects, not just the
Barons, could inform their government, whether Parliament or King, of their
complaints and needs, whether large or small. It also became a tool of individual
justice. By acting as a back-up to the courts when relief was wanting there, petitions
gave individuals the opportunity, if nothing more, to have a peaceful solution to their
disputes.”).
177. See Andrews, supra note 132, at 562.
178. Id. at 567.
179. Id. at 568. There is a very narrow doctrine, most famously demonstrated in
Boddie v. Connecticut, that allows plaintiffs to exercise their due process right to get
into court if the plaintiff’s fundamental rights are implicated and the dispute is one
that the parties cannot otherwise reconcile. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
382 (1971). However, this doctrine is exceedingly narrow and will likely not be of use
in this case. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444–45 (1973); Ortwein v.
Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659 (1973) (per curiam).
180. Andrews, supra note 132, at 677; see id. at 691 (“Though I contend that the
right of court access under the Petition Clause is a narrow right, I believe that it is a
meaningful right. It fills the void left by the Court’s due process decisions.”).
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Thus, Carol Rice Andrews concludes: “The Petition Clause
alone guarantees the average person the right to come to court
and ask for redress of his claim.” 181 These conclusions support the
argument that Congress cannot limit the jurisdiction of federal
courts beyond the bounds granted to them by Article III. As Andrews argues, this would “abridge the right [of citizens] to petition” courts for redress of grievances. 182 Indeed, there would be
relatively little to stop Congress from rendering the right to petition lower federal courts “almost meaningless” by “impos[ing] unreasonable preconditions on filing suits.”183
Under this view of the Petition Clause, § 102(c)’s judicial review provisions, which eliminate mid-level appellate review of unfavorable decisions, 184 may be unconstitutional because they unlawfully abridge the rights of citizens to seek appeal of
unfavorable decisions in the federal courts. Section 102(c) forces
parties aggrieved by a district court ruling on the issue of waiver
to seek review directly in the Supreme Court. 185 But this does little to protect the right to petition the “government”—including
the judicial branch—for a redress of grievances, partly because of
the Supreme Court’s reluctance to exercise its discretionary review authority, which makes it unlikely that an unfavorable decision will ever be subject to appeal. Because of the likelihood that
the Supreme Court will decline jurisdiction, § 102(c)’s waiver provisions have the effect of foreclosing all appellate review, meaning
that any ruling of a District Court will likely be final.
Additionally, IIRIRA § 102(c) limits judicial review of the
waiver process to claims that implicate constitutional, rather

181. Spanbauer, supra note 112, at 43 (“The Supreme Court has recognized that
the right of access to the courts is a component of the right to petition government for
a redress of grievances and is constitutionally protected.”); see id. at 45 (“The only
context in which the Supreme Court has been willing to find First Amendment
Petition Clause protection is civil actions in which collective activity is undertaken to
secure legal advice and initiate legal proceedings.”).
182. Andrews, supra note 132, at 666–67.
183. Id. at 667.
184. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, Title I §102, 119 Stat. 231,
302, 306, § 102(c).
185. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, Title I §102, 119 Stat.
231, 302, 306, §102(c)(2)(C) (“An interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or order of
the district court may be reviewed only upon petition for a writ certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States”).
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than statutory, rights. 186 This functions in much the same way as
the elimination of mid-level appeals: it substantially reduces an
aggrieved party’s access to courts, even when the agency is acting
outside of its statutory authority. 187
As a result, people aggrieved by the grant of a waiver may
find themselves in a position where they are unable to seek a redress of those grievances. This situation is precisely what the Petition Clause of the Constitution guarantees will not occur. 188
Consequently, its occurrence undercuts one of the oldest constitutional guarantees in our nation’s history and erects a different
kind of wall: one between the government’s decision-making process and the citizens who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of
that process.
While institutional restrictions on court access usually reflect “considered policy judgments,” courts must balance competing interests and consider the “nature and purpose behind the restriction and its impact on the right of access.” 189 Certain
restrictions on petitions, such as the number of signatures and
presenters of a petition, and requiring the “peaceful and orderly
presentation of petitions appear reasonable,” as their application
will prevent the possibility that large coercive groups would
overwhelm legislative assemblies.”190 However, effectively curtailing meaningful judicial review of decisions about the wall’s construction and financing hardly seems reasonable.
186. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, Title I §102, 119 Stat. 231,
302, 306, § 102(c).
187. It should be noted that, in rare cases, if an agency substantially exceeds the
bounds of its authority and acts in contravention of a “clear and mandatory”
statutory mandate, a court may exercise jurisdiction despite a statutory bar. See
Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188–89 (1958); In re Border Infrastructure Envtl.
Litig., 284 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1112–18 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (applying the doctrine of
Leedom v. Kyne to analyze DHS’ actions despite the bar in § 102(c)).
188. See Spanbauer, supra note 112, at 43–49 (arguing that the Petition Clause of
the Constitution should be red to include a right of access to the courts).
189. Andrews, supra note 132, at 673.
190. Spanbauer, supra note 112, at 38; see also Smith, supra note 116, at 1191
(“[T]he petition clause of the first amendment protects only the core petitioning
activities—preparing and signing a written petition and transmitting it to the
government—either individually or in concert with others but without the
involvement of public meetings. Any protection of activities beyond this scope is
derived from other constitutional rights. The important lesson from this analysis is
that no need can be established to impose time, place, and manner restrictions on
petitioning because no legitimate government interest such as maintaining public
order could be affected by the exercise of the core petitioning activities themselves.”).
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Although the Petition Clause may occupy the backwaters of
the First Amendment and is often ignored by litigants and courts,
nonetheless its guarantees are real. Included among those guarantees is arguably the right to access a court to complain about
some action by the government. While the right to petition is not
limitless, any restrictions cannot interfere with the basic right to
petition. And although the government need not redress the
grievance, at minimum, it must listen to the complaint—
meaning, at least arguably, courthouse doors must be open to receive it. To the extent that § 102(c) of IIRIRA 191 cuts off appellate
court access for individuals who have experienced a grievance at
the hands of their government, the waiver section of the border
wall statute violates the Petition Clause of the First Amendment,
making that section unenforceable. 192
B. NINTH AMENDMENT
“‘In sophisticated legal circles,’ wrote John Hart Ely, ‘mentioning the Ninth Amendment is a surefire way to get a
laugh.’” 193

Another constitutional theory supporting those who seek the
abolition of §102(c) of the IIRIRA is that it interferes with the
rights retained by the people under the Ninth Amendment by
lessening the protection given to those rights, including the ability of people to choose where they wish to live, to consort with
neighbors and friends, and to engage in certain practices and rituals.
The Ninth Amendment “prohibit[s] the denial or disparagement of ‘rights retained by the people’ in favor of rights enumerated in the Constitution.” 194 Some constitutional scholars view
the Ninth Amendment as superfluous, but this is more likely a
reflection of the fact that it has been buried under various theo191. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, Title I §102, 119 Stat. 231,
302, 306, § 102(c).
192. See Andrews, supra note 132, at 676–77 (“The Court has long applied ‘strict
scrutiny’ to judge regulation of First Amendment freedoms, including the right to
petition. This standard has many articulations, but it generally requires courts to
look to whether the government has a compelling state interest in regulating the
exercise of the right and whether the regulation is narrowly drawn to achieve that
goal with minimal impact on the right. Unlike other standards of review, this
standard is not deferential to the government.”).
193. Gordon, supra note 111, at 425.
194. Christina Carmody Tilley, Rescuing Dignity Torts from the Constitution, 78
BROOK. L. REV. 65, 76 (2012).
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ries of what the phrase “unenumerated rights” means. Some
scholars suggest that these constitutionally protected unenumerated rights are “natural rights” that are an aspect of “Western law
‘history and tradition’”; alternatively, other scholars argue that
these unenumerated rights can be state rights that either were
familiar at the time of the American founding, or ones that “developed consistent with constitutional jurisprudence after the
founding.” 195 As Mitchell Gordon puts it, the Ninth Amendment
“has been an unfortunate casualty of the enumeration wars.”196
1. BACKGROUND ON THE NINTH AMENDMENT
The Ninth Amendment engendered little debate when it was
introduced in Congress and passed both Houses with little change
to its original language. 197 The intent behind its introduction was
to quell fears that any proposed bill of enumerated rights would
not be sufficiently expansive to cover all essential rights, leaving
the possibility that any right that was not mentioned was not
protected; worse yet, that those unenumerated rights were intended to be given to the general government, not to the people,
leaving them “insecure.” 198
The Ninth Amendment is very short—only twenty-one
words. The Amendment declares that “[t]he enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.” 199 In effect, the
Amendment “adds an ‘et cetera’ to the end of th[e] list” of the first
195. Id. at 66.
196. Gordon, supra note 111, at 440.
197. Adam Lamparello, Fundamental Unenumerated Rights Under the Ninth
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 49 AKRON L. REV. 179, 199
(2016).
198. Id; see also id. (“As Justice Goldberg explained, the purpose of the Ninth
Amendment was ‘to prevent any perverse or ingenious misapplication of the wellknown maxim, that an affirmation in particular cases implies a negation in all
others; and, e converso, that a negation in particular cases implies an affirmation in
all others.’”); Lochlan F. Shelfer, How the Constitution Shall Not Be Construed, 2017
BYU L. REV. 331, 344 (2017) (“‘A bill of rights,’ he [James Wilson] declared, ‘is an
enumeration of the powers reserved. If we attempt an enumeration, everything that
is not enumerated is presumed to be given.’ Therefore, he concluded, ‘an imperfect
enumeration would throw all implied power into the scale of the government; and the
rights of the people would be rendered incomplete.’”). Madison called this “one of the
most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of
rights into this system.” Id. at 345.
199. Kalt, Brian C., The Ninth Amendment in Congress, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 75, 75
(2012).
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eight amendments in the Bill of Rights. 200 Unfortunately, there is
a problem with understanding the Amendment on its face: no one
knows for sure what the unenumerated rights are and the
amendment’s brevity does not give interpreters much guidance. 201
Although the Eighth Amendment is shorter, totaling sixteen
words, at the time of the framing of the Bill of Rights, the words
used in the Eighth Amendment were nearly a century old, having
first appeared in the 1689 English Bill of Rights. 202 In contrast,
the phrases appearing in the Ninth Amendment were completely
new. 203 Additionally, there were no counterparts to the Ninth
Amendment in the Articles of Confederation or in any of the laws
of the new states. 204 Time has not helped to clarify the issue; the
Supreme Court has never issued a majority opinion explaining
the Ninth Amendment’s meaning. 205 Perhaps as a result of this
lack of guidance, few courts have relied on the Ninth Amendment
as a basis for any decision they have rendered. 206 It is more often
used as a “punch line” than as a serious citation. 207 However, despite its detractors, the Ninth Amendment significantly enhances
the Constitution’s protective scope. 208
The Ninth Amendment prevents narrow interpretations of
constitutional text that would abridge rights. 209 It acts to delegitimize an argument that any right just beyond the unembellished
words of constitutional text are unprotected. 210 Lochlan F. Shelfer
commented that the Ninth Amendment instructs those who in200. Id. at 76; see also DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE “SILENT”
NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON’T KNOW
THEY HAVE 1, 4 (2007) (describing the Ninth Amendment as adding “a crucial ‘etc.’ to
the Bill [of Rights]”).
201. Gordon, supra note 111, at 423.
202. Gordon, supra note 111, at 423 n.22.
203. Id. at 423 n.22.
204. Id. at 427.
205. Id. at 423–24.
206. Gordon, supra note 111, at 423–24.
207. Tilley, supra note 194, at 77.
208. Gordon, supra note 111, at 427.
209. Lochlan F. Shelfer, How the Constitution Shall Not Be Construed, 2017 BYU L.
REV. 331, 333 (2017) (“Over the centuries, interpreters have construed the wording of
particular constitutional rights to deny the existence of analogous but unarticulated
rights by negative implication. Such interpretations have used the words of
constitutional protections to deny closely related or even implicit protections. The
Constitution, however, contains a clause prohibiting narrow constructions of the
Constitution’s text that abridge rights: the Ninth Amendment.”).
210. Shelfer, supra note 209, at 384.
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terpret constitutional principles not to view their meaning as
narrow or absolute, but to wonder whether the Constitution
might protect similar rights “just beyond the bare text.211 In other
words, when the Constitution protects a particular textual right,
this does not mean that a right that is “similarly situated, analogous or functionally similar” is not protected.212 Thus, to the extent that a right to cross-border travel might be considered comparable to other “privileges” that citizens enjoy under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
such as the right to interstate travel, 213 that right could potentially be protected by the Ninth Amendment, even though it is unenumerated.
One way of looking at the Ninth Amendment is that it is
“about what the Constitution does not say.” 214 It tells us that we
should not diminish something just because it is not explicit. 215
Thus, the point of the Amendment is to clarify that all individual
natural rights remained in force, notwithstanding that only some
had been specifically set out in the constitutional text. 216 In sum,
the Amendment’s principal function is to ensure that rights that
are not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, but which
were protected before the Constitution was adopted, would continue to enjoy protection. 217
As Mitchell Gordon points out, this is about as “metalegal” as
one can get: words that “point off the page” for their meaning,
alerting the reader that that there is “more constitution ‘out
there.’” 218 As such, its guarantees are often treated with a
211. Id. at 376; see also id. at 383 (“There is, indeed, very little extant evidence for
the ratification of the Bill of Rights in general and the Ninth Amendment in
particular. But the evidence that exists suggests that attempts to limit the scope of
the Ninth Amendment by narrowly construing the word ‘retained’ may conflict with
its own ratification history and poorly fit its anti-exclusionary meaning.”).
212. Id. at 383; see Gordon, supra note 111, at 432 (“The Ninth Amendment is
unlike other constitutional provisions, not because it is vague, open-ended, etc. (for
that is hardly unique), but because it is metaconstitutional: [i]t is an instruction
about how to read the text we are already reading.”).
213. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1872) (describing the right to
interstate travel as being protected under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
214. Gordon, supra note 111, at 469.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 457.
217. Id. at 469.
218. Id.
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“strange mix of marvel [and] disdain.” 219 Yet, as Gordon also
notes, the disdain for the Ninth Amendment “seems out of proportion” 220 because “[t]he Ninth Amendment is not the only unenumerated rights clause that was ever written, after all; it is not
even the only one in our Constitution.”221 Perhaps this is a reason
to take the guarantees of the Ninth Amendment more seriously.
Brian Kalt reasonably argues that the Amendment’s language of retained rights should not be limited to rights that existed in 1791; instead the amendment should be susceptible to a
modern reading, just as the other eight amendments are. 222 This
view reflects Madison’s desire “to communicate to AntiFederalists that all rights under state laws then ‘on the books’
would be protected from harm, as would any additional rights
that the states might later enact.” 223 Accordingly, the “specific
function of the Ninth Amendment was to prevent any suggestion
that these preexisting rights had been supplanted.” 224
If the purpose of the Ninth Amendment is to instruct Congress to think more broadly about rights than those enumerated
in the Constitution, then there should be no limit to what rights
Congress can consider, including new ones, as long as it can
“muster a sufficient consensus” for whatever the new right is. 225
The additional right must also be “entrenched” 226 to earn more
protection than an ordinary statute might offer, 227 protecting it
from repeal or change. It is possible to make this argument with
respect to a statutory right; though, according to Kalt, in order to
be entrenched as an unenumerated right, the statute must substantially change the status quo and “stick[] in the public culture
in a deep way, becoming foundational or axiomatic to our thinking.” 228 This means that a modern Congress can introduce positive and collective rights, like “the right to a healthy environ-

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Gordon, supra note 111, at 469.
Id.
Id.
Kalt, supra note 199, at 82.
Gordon, supra note 111, at 449–50 (emphasis added).
Id. at 449–50.
Kalt, supra note 199, at 89.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 89.
Kalt, supra note 199, at 93–94.
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ment[] or intergenerational equity,” 229 which can receive protection under the Ninth Amendment.
However, one does not need to wait for Congress to create
new rights because “[t]he language and history of the Ninth
Amendment reveal that the Framers of the Constitution believed
that there are additional fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional
amendments.” 230 The Amendment’s text makes that clear when it
says that the Constitution’s list of enumerated rights “shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” 231
2. VARIOUS MEANINGS OF THE CONCEPT OF UNENUMERATED
RIGHTS
Due to its ambiguity, scholars have varying opinions on the
meaning of the Ninth Amendment, including: “a source of natural
justice rights[,] a rule of construction for securing unenumerated
rights (but not a source of rights)[,] a grant of standing to argue
public rights[,] a source of public rights[,] and solely a protector of
individual, personal rights.” 232 Courts and legal scholars have
largely ignored the Ninth Amendment, in part because of the
trouble they have understanding it. 233 Another problem is that
although the “selective incorporation doctrine and the Supremacy
Clause give the U.S. Supreme Court authority to create express,
implied, and unenumerated rights,” the Court’s inclusion of unenumerated rights within the category of implied rights means
they remain largely unrecognized as a separate type of right.234
Some scholars, like Adam Lamparello, argue that the Court
can “create unenumerated rights by relying on the text of the
Ninth Amendment” in order to “ensur[e] that state and federal
229. Id. at 90–91.
230. Lamparello, supra note 197, at 199 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 488–89 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
231. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
232. Ronald E. Klipsch, Aspects of a Constitutional Right to a Habitable
Environment: Towards an Environmental Due Process, 49 IND. L.J. 203, 219–220
(1974).
233. Duane Ostler, Rights under the Ninth Amendment: Not Hard to Identify after
All, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 35, 38 (Jan.–Sept. 2013).
234. Lamparello, supra note 197, at 191.
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laws do not infringe on individual liberty.” 235 Lamparello argues,
for example, that the Ninth Amendment grants the Court the
power to protect individual rights to make consensual sexual
choices or to use contraceptives. 236 Applying Lamparello’s view,
one might argue that the Court could use the Ninth Amendment
to protect unenumerated, but fundamental rights that the border
wall might impair, such as the right to travel or the right to engage in one’s traditional, cultural practices. This interpretation
could create significant implications for the waiver provisions of
the border wall—as well as for the wall itself.
Another scholar, Brian C. Kalt, takes a slightly different
view: that the Ninth Amendment allows Congress to address the
existence of new positive and negative rights. 237 Specifically, in
Kalt’s view, there must be a congressional consensus supporting
the new right, regardless of whether the new right is a positive
one or a negative one. 238 Under this view, the border wall may
well interfere with unenumerated rights; while it might be hard
to believe that it would not be difficult to gain congressional support for a right to travel and practice one’s traditional rituals,
given Congress’ current dysfunction, this assumption may not be
valid.
An unenumerated right can be phrased as an entitlement to
engage in a certain activity, like travel, or a right to be free from
any impediment to that activity, such as a right to be free from a
ban preventing travel. Although the list of positive rights that
might be protected by the Ninth Amendment is potentially “infinite,” according to scholars like Lamparello and Kalt, this flexibility is consistent with the Ninth Amendment’s “open-ended nature.” 239 However, according to natural rights theorists like
Randy Barnett, the Amendment does not protect those positive
rights, such as civil trial by jury, that do not predate the Constitution. 240 Daniel Farber agrees with that view, positing that the
Amendment protects rights that are not created by positive law;
instead, it protects natural rights that predate positive law.241

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 205.
Id. at 204.
Kalt, supra note 199, at 77.
Kalt, supra note 199, at 89.
See Kalt, supra note 185, at 91; Lamparello, supra note 197, at 182, 201.
Shelfer, supra note 209, at 338; see Kalt, supra note 199, at 91.
Shelfer, supra note 209, at 339.
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Rights protected by the Ninth Amendment are inalienable.242
Such rights are different from implied rights which are “ancillary
to and necessary for the full realization of the protections afforded
by the Bill of Rights’ express provisions.” 243 As Adam Lamperello
explains: “[U]nenumerated fundamental rights, such as the right
to privacy and the right to make consensual sexual choices, exist
independently of the Constitution’s text but have the same force
as enumerated rights.” 244 Lamparello argues that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments plays no
role as a source of unenumerated rights. 245 His argument is not
that rights that are acknowledged under the substantive Due
Process Clause are not worthy of being considered fundamental,
but rather that the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause are “more legitimate sources of these rights
because the Founders intended them to protect substantive unenumerated liberties.” 246 This, however, leads to a more difficult
question: which enumerated rights are protected by the Ninth
Amendment?
3. DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR DETERMINING WHICH
UNENUMERATED RIGHTS ARE PROTECTED
Descriptions of the Ninth Amendment’s scope and guarantees are often grand. For example, Thomas B. McAffee wrote:
242. Id.
243. Lamparello, supra note 197, at 180.
244. Lamparello, supra note 197, at 180. Lamparello argues that the Ninth
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause are “the proper means by
which to recognize such rights.” Id.
245. Lamparello, supra note 197, at 182–83 (noting that implied rights are
different from unenumerated rights, the source of which is the Ninth Amendment or
the Privileges or Immunities Clause and not the Due Process Clause, enabling the
courts to respond to “abuses that occur in the democratic and political process.”); but
see Gordon, supra note 111, at 439 (“[C]ourts protect all enumerated rights but also
protect some additional specific unenumerated rights (through substantive due
process). This is the approach the Supreme Court took in Griswold and which the
Court has continued to take in the five decades since, enforcing some unenumerated
rights by identifying them as within the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process
Clause.”).
246. Lamparello, supra note 197, at 198 (emphasis added). Lamparello believes
that linking the Ninth Amendments language retaining other rights not mentioned
in the Constitution to the prohibition in the Privileges or Immunities Clause
preventing the abridgement of any privileges or immunities possessed by any
citizens is a way to develop a “credible unenumerated rights jurisprudence” and
provide a basis for the “Court to abandon its much-maligned substantive due process
jurisprudence.” Id. at 203. It also would provide a basis for recognizing “other
enumerated rights at are implicit in free societies.” Id. at 183.
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the [N]inth [A]mendment refers to constitutional rights as we
generally think of them today—legally enforceable, affirmatively defined limitations on governmental power on behalf of
individual claimants . . . the rights its adherents conceive of
are to be defined independently of, and may serve to limit the
scope of, powers granted to the national government by the
Constitution.247

This descriptive language, however, is not very helpful for the difficult task of figuring out which rights are protected by the Ninth
Amendment. As a result of the difficulty this endeavor poses,
there are almost as many different approaches to figuring out
what unenumerated rights are as there are identified unenumerated rights.
Natural rights proponents “interpret the Ninth Amendment’s reference to ‘other [rights] retained by the people’ as protecting the universe of unenumerated natural rights.” 248 As a
proponent of this interpretative school, Randy Barnett believes
the concept of unenumerated rights in the Ninth Amendment includes all individual natural rights in existence prior to the Constitution. 249 According to Barnett, since it is impossible to identify
all the rights one has under the Ninth Amendment in advance,
the best solution is to “adopt a ‘presumption of liberty’ approach”

247. Lamparello, supra note 197, at 201–02; see id. at 200 (quoting Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)) (arguing that the
Ninth Amendment “lends strong support to the view that the ‘liberty’ protected by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from infringement by the Federal
Government or the States is not restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first
eight amendments.”).
248. Shelfer, supra note 209, at 338; see Gordon, supra note 111, at 459 (“Retained
rights are those natural rights that have not been given up under the terms of the
social compact-i.e., have not been relinquished in the formation of political society.”).
249. Shelfer, supra note 209, at 338; see also id. at 339 (“He [Barnett] argues that
the text of the Ninth Amendment ‘strongly suggests that unenumerated rights
deserve no less protection from courts than those that were enumerated.’”).
According to Duane Ostler, individual rights were derived from the laws of nature,
predated the social compact, and were derived from the laws of God, imbuing them
with a moral sensibility. Ostler, supra note 233, at 32, 41; see also id. at 82 (“It was
the intent of the Founders that any unenumerated rights found to be constitutional
would be derived from the Ninth Amendment. These were rights that were based on
the fundamental laws of nature, and were not considered as changing over time.”);
id. at 35 (“The Founders very firmly intended that the Ninth Amendment would
include fundamental, morally-based rights from their generation that should
continue to be followed by succeeding generations.”).
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that places the burden of justifying “the necessity and propriety
of any infringement on individual freedom” on the government.250
Brian Kalt advocates a somewhat different approach, arguing that the Ninth Amendment can be used to preserve “so-called
collective rights (like the right to a healthy environment, or intergenerational equity), or animal rights, or really any sort [of
right]” as long as there is enough congressional support.251
Those who view questions like these through a federalism
lens think that the Ninth Amendment works together with the
Tenth Amendment as a constraint on the federal government in
relation to state governments. 252 Duane Ostler views the Ninth
Amendment as “crucial” for protecting natural rights from encroachment by the legislative branch. 253 Akhil Amar argues that
one of the Amendment’s primary purposes is to “protect collective
rights and popular sovereignty” and the “‘core meaning’ of the
phrase ‘the people’ in the ‘Ninth Amendment is collective,’” giving
“We the People” the “collective right . . . to alter or abolish government.” 254
Theories for identifying what retained rights are covered by
the Ninth Amendment include: “‘natural-law’ rights as originally
publicly understood by the Framers; rights deemed ‘natural’ by
virtue of their deep roots in Western and American legal tradition; state-law rights at the time of ratification; and state law
rights post-ratification.” 255 “The ‘natural-law rights’ theory of the
Ninth Amendment suggests that any right understood at the time
of ratification to belong to individuals, as distinct from rights derived from membership in a centrally governed society, was
among those ‘rights retained’ by the people.’” 256 Thus, rights retained under the Ninth Amendment might include the right to

250. Gordon, supra note 111, at 439.
251. Kalt, supra note 199, at 91; see also id. (“One important category is statebased rights, which are also not completely enumerated in the Constitution.”).
252. Shelfer, supra note 209, at 340.
253. Ostler, supra note 233, at 45.
254. Shelfer, supra note 209, at 340.
255. Tilley, supra note 194, at 78–79; see also id. at 81 (“[U]nder the ‘state rights’
theory, ‘the ninth amendment preserves rights existing under state laws already ‘on
the books’ in 1791 plus those rights which the states would thereafter see fit to
enact.’”).
256. Id. at 79.
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travel, to look for work, and self-defense. 257 The important understanding to have about the founding generation’s understanding
of the concept was its polarity with governmental powers. In other words, “rights began where powers ended, and powers began
where rights ended.” 258
Another theoretical approach to the Ninth Amendment views
it not as a stand-alone source of constitutional rights, but as a
“rule of construction that governs when unenumerated- butretained rights clash with enumerated rights.” 259 The approach
contends that unenumerated retained rights cannot be given
“categorical second class status when they conflict with enumerated rights.” 260 Thus, unenumerated rights are entrenched in the
Constitution even if they are not specific rights set out in the
Constitution. 261 A final theory is that the Amendment covers
rights that fit within a penumbra, or shadow, that emanates from
guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights. 262 Many of these in257. Id. at 78–79. Mitchell Gordon lists examples of where the Court “has
recognized or enforced liberties not specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights,”
including, “the right to relocate or travel interstate, see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 338-42 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969); the right to
vote, see Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 625–29 (1969);
Harper v. Va. Bd. Of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665–70 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 55–58 (1964); and the right to equal protection of federal laws, see Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954). Other unenumerated rights the Court has
recognized include the right to bodily integrity, see Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210, 221–22 (1990); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.165, 172–73 (1952); the right to
marry or not marry, see Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–87 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); the
right to make one’s own decisions about having children, including the decision to
use contraceptives or terminate a pregnancy, see Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431
U.S. 678, 694 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485–86 (1965); Skinner v.
Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); the right to live with one’s own
family, see Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (plurality
opinion); and the right to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, see
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); see also Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).”). Gordon, supra note 111, at 433–34 n.87.
258. Tilley, supra note 194, at 79–80.
259. Id. at 78. Mitchell Gordon complains that this approach tends “to deemphasize
the specific ends the amendment aims to protect or advance.” Gordon, supra note
111, at 451.
260. Tilley, supra note 194, at 78.
261. Kalt, supra note 199, at 96.
262. “The reference to a ‘penumbra’ in respect to the Amendments comes from a
statement of Justice Douglas in Griswold, in which he said that “specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life.” Ostler, supra note 233, at 53 n.59 (citing Griswold v.
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terpretive theories suggest that “rights retained” under the Ninth
Amendment “have status as independent constitutional rights,
thus playing the same judicially enforceable ‘oversight role’ with
regard to state or federal law as do the enumerated constitutional
rights.” 263 Accordingly, the question of which rights are “retained”
is a very significant and “politically charged” inquiry because
“these rights could serve as the basis for striking down legislation” that abridges those rights. 264 This is where the Ninth
Amendment potentially intersects with § 102(c)’s waiver provisions: if the waiver provisions (or the wall itself) abridge these retained rights, a court could strike down that portion of the statute.
4. THE NINTH AMENDMENT CAN PROTECT NEW
UNENUMERATED RIGHTS
There are two basic arguments for using the Ninth Amendment as a source of a new substantive rights: 265 first, that the
Ninth Amendment is its own source of these rights; and second,
that the Ninth Amendment acts as a rule of construction that allows an interpreter to search the Constitution for unenumerated
rights. 266 The general understanding is that the Ninth Amendment is not an “independent source of rights,” but the Amendment’s “language and history imply the existence of unenumerated fundamental rights which are contained in the traditions and
collective conscience of our people.” 267 For example, Thomas C.
Grey, relying on the concurring opinion of Justice Goldberg in
Griswold v. Connecticut, maintains that “[t]he [N]inth
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)); see Gordon, supra note 111, at 431 (“The task
of writing for the Court’s majority [in Griswold v. Connecticut] fell to Justice
Douglas, who used the Ninth Amendment in the customary (i.e., auxiliary) way,
mentioning it only in passing as one of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights that ‘ha[s]
penumbras, formed by emanations from [such] guarantees.’”); see also id. (“Fifty
years later, it is still this general liberty category that the Court uses as a textual
basis for rights not explicitly described by the text.”).
263. Tilley, supra note 194, at 77.
264. Id.
265. For a similar discussion of using the Ninth Amendment to protect new
unenumerated rights, see Hope M. Babcock, The Federal Government Has an Implied
Moral Constitutional Duty to Protect Individuals from Harm Due to Climate Change:
Throwing Spaghetti Against the Wall to See What Sticks, 45 ECOLOGY L.Q. 735, 783–
85 (2018).
266. Klipsch, supra note 232, at 220; see also id. at 221 (“By its terms the
amendment applies to the entire Constitution, rather than just the first eight
amendments.”).
267. Id. at 222.

56

Loyola Law Review

[Vol. 67

[A]mendment on its face has no substantive content. It is rather a
license to constitutional decisionmakers to look beyond the substantive commands of the constitutional text to protect fundamental rights not expressed therein.” 268 In Grey’s view, the Ninth
Amendment reflects the Framers’ belief that “unwritten higher
law principles had constitutional status”—a belief that is reflected in both the letter and spirit of the Constitution, including in
the “majestic generalities” of the Fourteenth Amendment. 269
However, in order for the rights and duties discussed in this
article—namely, a right to cross-border travel, a right to engage
in traditional practices, and a right to enjoy wildlife—to be protected under the Ninth Amendment, these rights and duties must
stand on firm historical footing. In other words, these rights can
only be protected under the Ninth Amendment if they could be
considered “higher law principle[s]” akin to those protected by
traditional natural rights. 270
There is an added complication: because the Ninth Amendment “suffers from . . . uncertainties and controversy[,]” 271 it
alone seems a “slender reed” 272 to support such a new right. The
fact that the contours of the Ninth Amendment are dependent on
how the term “retained rights” is defined and the term is not selfdefined in the Amendment means one can “get wildly different
pictures of the Ninth Amendment,” which would require “some
additional defining at the outset, simply to make the Ninth
Amendment usable.” 273

268. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703, 709 (1975).
269. Id. at 717.
270. See Gordon, supra note 111, at 468 (“The Court will continue to enforce some
unenumerated rights, provided those rights fall within the appropriate subset (e.g.,
fundamental rights). To make that determination, the Court will presumably look at
any number of factors. If one of those factors is historical evidence, then the integrity
of those determinations will depend in part on whether they are supported by
plausible historical fact.”).
271. Babcock, supra note 265, at 784.
272. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920). But see Shelfer, supra note 209,
at 384 (“Indeed, even in the sparse ratification history of the Bill of Rights, one can
perceive the Ninth Amendment’s role in instructing readers how (not) to interpret
individual textual provisions of the Constitution. This constitutional history also
strongly suggests that the Ninth Amendment applies not just to natural rights but
also to procedural and positive rights.”).
273. Gordon, supra note 111, at 449.
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Turning to the rights potentially affected by the border wall,
one can argue that enjoyment of wildlife and the ability to engage
in cultural practices that involve wildlife are embedded in the collective consciousness of our citizens. There are many statutes recognizing the importance of this right, including the Endangered
Species Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act, as well as a variety of other federal
laws setting aside public lands and wildlife for communal enjoyment. There are also an inordinate number of state and local
laws, as well as common law, protecting the rights of people to enjoy and use the environment and wildlife. This could show evidence of a “congressional consensus” that environmental rights
are fundamental and, therefore, worthy of Ninth Amendment protection. 274 Furthermore, the enjoyment of wildlife and the ability
to engage in cultural practices have been protected by laws and
traditions that predate the written Constitution, thereby potentially qualifying for Ninth Amendment protection under even the
more restrictive tests. 275
To the extent that the waiver provisions of IIRIRA lessen the
protections available for wildlife or cultural resources, they violate the unenumerated rights of citizens to enjoy and use those
resources. However, this may be a difficult claim; it is unclear
whether environmental rights would actually fall within the ambit of unenumerated rights protected by the Ninth Amendment.
Ultimately, “[t]he blunt fact is that there is simply no ‘clear legal
and historical precedent for basic constitutional environmental
rights[,]’” 276 so showing that these rights are protected by the
Ninth Amendment will be an uphill battle.
Additionally, one can argue that the Ninth Amendment prohibits construction of a border wall to the extent that such a wall
would inhibit travel between Mexico and the United States by
cross-border inhabitants, like Indian tribes. Cross-border tribes
who travel between Mexico and the United States to see family,
engage in traditional ceremonies, and collect medicinal plants
and animals, will no longer be able to engage in these activities,

274. See Kalt, supra note 199, at 89.
275. For example, the public trust doctrine and laws regulating public access to
natural resources predate the Constitution. See Carole L. Gallagher, The Movement
to Create an Environmental Bill of Rights: From Earth Day, 1970 to the Present, 9
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 107, 132–33 (1997).
276. Babcock, supra note 265, at 785.
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which interferes with their existing rights. 277 Such traditional
rights may be protected under the Ninth Amendment. 278 The activities of concern include cross-border movement by tribes, the
ability of tribes to practice traditional rituals on both sides of the
border, and the unimpeded movement of wildlife across the border, the enjoyment of which is potentially important to people
who observe or hunt wildlife or who rely on them for traditional
practices.
There is little question that people have an inherent right to
travel and to move freely within the territorial United States. 279
“Article IV of the Articles of Confederation stated that all persons
‘shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens
in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free
ingress and regress to and from any other State.’” 280 This right to
leave and enter a state dates back to the Magna Carta, which
stated that “[i]t shall be lawful in future for any one . . . to leave
our kingdom and to return, safe and secure by land and water,
except for a short period in time of war, on grounds of public policy—reserving always the allegiance due to us.”281 Ostler claims
that “the right to travel had been a recognized, natural right for
centuries by the time of the drafting of the Constitution.”282
The right to travel across the U.S.-Mexico border is similar
to this ancient natural right and, therefore, may fall under the
277. Ordway, supra note 9 (citing Leza, supra note 77).
278. See Thomas B. McAffee, A Critical Guide to the Ninth Amendment, 69 TEMP.
L.R. 61, 67 (1996) (discussing a reading of the Ninth Amendment to protect
unenumerated natural rights and traditions); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 491 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (discussing how the Ninth
Amendment can protect rights that are “basic” and “fundamental” and “deeprooted in
our society”).
279. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 44 (1867) (“[The citizen] has the right to
come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that
government, or to transact any business he may have with it. To seek its protection,
to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions. He has a right to free
access to its sea-ports through which all the operations of foreign trade are
conducted . . . and this right is in its nature independent of the will of any State over
whose soil he must pass in exercise of it.”).
280. Ostler, supra note 233, at 84; see also id. at 83–84 (“[T]he 1776 Declaration of
Rights in the Pennsylvania Constitution identified the right to travel as a natural
right, stating in Article fifteen ‘That all men have a natural inherent right to
emigrate from one state to another that will receive them.’ The 1777 Vermont
Declaration of Rights had nearly identical wording.”).
281. Id. at 84.
282. Id.
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Ninth Amendment’s protective penumbra. The right to travel between countries can be and is regulated and, in some cases, prevented, but any restriction on that right must be reasonable, and
the burden is on the government to prove its reasonableness. 283
The facts do not demonstrate that the construction of a wall to
prevent citizens of another country traveling to the United
States, let alone back and forth across the border is reasonable,
making the construction of the wall an unconstitutional violation
of the Ninth Amendment.
The Ninth Amendment bars interference with fundamental
rights like the right to engage in traditional ceremonies and the
right to travel. The statute’s waiver of laws protecting animals
and plants that are of importance to those ceremonies lessens the
rights of citizens to engage in those ceremonies, while construction of a wall prevents their occurrence in the first place. To the
extent that the border wall does those things, it violates the unenumerated rights of affected citizens and must fall.
VI. CONCLUSION
Government, in my humble opinion, should be formed to secure and to enlarge the exercise of the natural rights of its members; every government, which has not this in view as its principal object, is not legitimate. 284
Despite the questionable and morally troubling impetus to
construct a physical barrier between the United States and Mexico, the barrier is being built. The inability of the wall’s opponents
to deploy environmental and historic preservation laws that
might prevent or slow down the construction have steered and
eased its path. Congress has waived the application of these laws
to the wall’s construction and made appealing the application of
these waiver provisions almost impossible. As a result, to date,
challenges brought by opponents to these provisions have not
prevailed.
Applying the Petition Clause of the First Amendment to the
truncated appeal provisions of the border wall statute that allow
waiver of protective environmental and cultural laws could provide a novel challenge that sidesteps the statutory snares built
283. See Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964); see also id. at 526–27
(1964) (Clark, J., dissenting) (discussing how the government may reasonably
restrict the right to travel).
284. Ostler, supra note 233, at 77 (quoting James Wilson).
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into the IIRIRA. Additionally, applying the Ninth Amendment to
the law’s interference with the unenumerated right to engage in
traditional activities and travel could challenge the problematic
portions of the IIRIRA and provide a fresh avenue for expanding
fundamental rights in other contexts. With respect to the Petition
Clause, the statute’s elimination of an interim level of appeal for
any initially unsuccessful judicial appeal, allowing appeal only to
the Supreme Court, severely restricts the ability of citizens to petition the judicial branch with their grievances, and thus potentially violates the First Amendment. With respect to the Ninth
Amendment, if we view its provisions as containing sufficient
elasticity, it is likely to protect unenumerated rights that preexisted the Constitution and which are intrinsic to members of a
civil society, including the right to travel and to engage in traditional practices (such as visiting ancestral graves or collecting
plants and animals for traditional rituals). To the extent that
these activities will be less protected and thus less feasible because of the statute’s waiver provisions or interfered with because
of the wall’s physical barrier, the statute interferes with protected
enumerated rights. If that view is correct, then the border wall
statute also violates the Ninth Amendment.
If these arguments have any merit, then the statute authorizing the border wall violates the constitutional protections of the
First and Ninth Amendments. Accordingly, the wall’s constructions must be stopped, and those portions of the wall that are already built, must come down.

